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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

-------------1

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vs-

CAROLYN NICHOLS
10 Exchange Place, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE

SUPRE~1E

COURT OF 'CHE

STATE OF UTAH

S'l'I\Tr: OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15617

-v:-;--

BRENT JAY SESSIONS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Burglary, a felony
of the third degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and
was found guilty by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, District
Judge.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of not more than

five years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence rendered below.
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STA~EMENT

Appelli1nt
Louis

n.

wa:~

OF FACTS

L.i:icc1 jointly with his roorn , 1 te,

Dc::ihbs.
Durin<J the ni9ht of September 15, 1977,

2

:;ervice

station was broken into, and a television, sixty to '"ight/
pounds of frozen meat, ctnd some safety inspection st:i ck cc;
were s•-,

•n from the p

iniscs

(R.67-70).

On Scptc•rnbcL· 22,

1977, lh.:puty Sheriff !-IL_ice Hunks executed a search \/arrant

at the a
lived

trc·,:nt where the appellants Sessions and Dabbs

(~.73-74).

Deputy Hanks found a television, a guC1ntity

1lf frozen meat, and some safety inspection stickers during
his search (R.74).

All of these objects were identified

as the ones stolen from the service station (R.68-70).

The

apartm nt is located approximately two city blocks frorn the
service station (R.74).
as~:ed

During the search, Deputy Hunks

who the television belonged to (R. 77).

Scss_i_o11s replied that it belonged to a friend;
Dabbs did not reply.

Id

asked about the stickers.

The app;_·llant

the co-defendan

Later in the search, Deputy Hanks
Id.

The appellant Sessions said

nothing, but the co-defendnnt Dabbs answered that he was
an investor.

Id.

At the time of trial, appellant filed three motions.
'L'he firsL. was a motion +:o sever based on the c;rounc1 that
co-defendilnt Dabbs' st0tcment ("I am an investor'') w~s
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adn1is

~ble at trial and would prejudicially incrimin<lte

Sessions (R.22).

This motion was denied

(R.49).

The

second motion asked that all evidence gained by Deputy
Hank'.'' search be suppressed on the grounds that the
affi, :vi t upon which the warrant
(R.21).
the ,

j

ssued was defective

The appellitnt did not produce the warrant or

:'idavit in support of his motion, nor did he make

a mo 1 .ion to cliscover that evidence (R. 56-57).

The

court below held that the appellant had the burden of
going forward on the motion to suppress, and that in the
absence of any evidence the motion would be denied
56,57).

(R.50,

The court below then denied the motion to

suppress with neither the warrant nor the affidavit
before it (R.56-57).

The third motion asked that the

identity of a confidential informant be disclosed

(R.23).

Deputy Hanks represented to the court below that the disclosure of the informant's identity would jeopardize the
inf0rmant's safety and decrease his usefulness as an
informant (R.62).

The court below held that disclosure

of the informant's identity would not aid the defense and
denied the motion (R.62-63).
at

tri~l.

The informant did not testify

The court found both defendants guilty (R.24).

The defendant Dabbs was placed on probation (R.41), and
defendant Sessions

~as

sentenced to serve a term of not
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less th<111 five yei.Jrs in the Utuh State Prison, this
sentc>nce to run

conccirrenU~'

de£endunt Sessions

Wi 1 : ;

with the other sentence

servi.119 (R.34).

It is from this cr·.nviction and sentence that
the defendant Sessions appeals.
ARGUMELJT

POHlT I

THE COURT BF.LOW D:tD NOT ERR IN DENYING THE

r :yr ION TO SEVER.
Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same information if it is alleged that they participated
in t!ie same act that constitutes an offense.
Ann.

§

77-21-31 (2)

(Supp. 1977).

Utah Coc1e

Appellant claims,

however, that it was error to try him with his roommate
Dabbs because Dabbs' statement (i.e., "I am an investor")
would incriminate thc1 appellant and deny the appellant
his right to cross-examine Dabbs.

Respondent insists

that this claim of error is without merit for three
reasons.

First, Dabbs' statement does not incriminute

the appell3nt, and its

admissio~

have prejudiced th:' appellant.

at trial could not
Second, appellant was

tried without a jury, and the c0urt below is presumed
to know the law (i.e., that Dabbs' hearsay statement wus
only admissible against Dabbs) and to have ucted in

-4-
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accocdancc with the law.

Third, the statement was not a

confes~ion,~1d is not within the rule of

law established

by the authorities cited by the app,·lla.nt.
As to the first point, respondent contends that
Dabbs' s~atement, "I am an investor," does not refer to the
app~llant Ses~ions

incriminate
"

•

h~n.

and cannot be reasonably construed to
Appellant ar0ues that the statement,

i:.--: incriminLitory in that it shows a knowledge on th£_

part _of_Dabb_c; of where he got the stickers."
Appellant, p. 3, emphasis added.)

Assu~ing

(Brief of
that is true,

it still does not incriminate Session, the appellant in
this case, because being an "investor" has no relationship
to being in possession of a television, sixty pounds of
frozen meat, and numerous state safety inspection stickers.
Respondent must conclude that appellant has not shown that
admission of Dabbs' statement was prejudicial to him.
Further, respondent avers that any possible
prejudice was removed because the case was heard by the
court without a jury.

In State v. McLaughlin, 22 Utah 2d 321,

452 P.2d 875 (1969), a defendant claimed error because a
statement made by a co-defendant was admitted in evidence.
This Court stated:
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"Some of the more recent
cases indicate thut a jury,
Gven \'Ii th proriC'r instructions by
t!Je court, woulc1 likely fail to
consider an ad1 'ission or conf Pssj on
only a9ainst l:J'~ cL::clarant.
In
thG in:;tant case, 1ve conclude that
a trL 1_ judcy· of learning 0nd
exper: :,nee wouJ_d only consider
i.:'1e e·, ;_rlr.:crtC2 as ii~ rcl_atecl to the
issd•; ,~;- th;c guilt 0( innocence
of i1c1, ·:;-hlin."
(Fo·:tnotcs omitted.)
~I._cLC',1;. - '~n_ at 373, 452 P.2c1 at 876.
Respondent submits tl1at the court below kne1v that Dab')s'
statement was not aclmissible against the appellant, and
did not consider it in finding the appellant guilty.
Finally, respondent contends that the constitutional

re~uirement

for separate trials of co-defendants

only applies in cases of confessions and not in every case
The rationale of Bruton v.

of an incriminatory statement.

United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), was that, although a
j~ry

can follow many cautionary instructions,

• there

are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will

~ot,

or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of fai1ure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system cnnnot
be ignored."

Bruton at 135.

Bruton suggests that a

confession of a co-defendant can be such inf lamwat.ory
evidence that cautionary instructions rnily not reliE've the
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defendant of prcju{ice.

Respondent doubts, however, that

eveiy statc;ment of a co-def(•ndant is this influ.mmatory.
I\ppellant's atte;npt to expand the Bruton rule beyond
confessions is not persuasive.

Justice Stewart's concurring

opinion in Bruton at 137 ~tatc~ that it is improper to rely
on cautionary inst>uctio.1s when
0~1'::-of-court

evidence.

11

••

the highly damaging

statPrnent of a cocl_nfendant" is placed in

Dabbs' statement, even if considered prejudicial

to the appellant,

c~nnot

be categorized as a highly

dam~ging,

inflammu.tory piece of evidence that cannot be objectively
weighed.

Respondent submits that the admission of Dabbs'

statement was not prejudicial error.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY OF A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT.
The State has a privilege to refuse to disclose
the identity of an informer unless the trial court finds that
his identity has already been disclosed or disclosure is
essential to assure a fair determination of the issues.
Rules of Evidence, Rule 36.

Utah

The defendant has the burden of

demonstrating that the informant would be a material witness
on the issue of guilt.
139, 514 P.2c1 800, 803

State v. Bankhead, 30 Utah 2d 135,
(1973).

Further, a defendant may

not compel disclosure of an informant's identity to contest

-7-
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Irl.

at 118, 511} P.2(1

802.

f-:

r:esponclr:nt avers that

appcll<:lnL has not carried his burden of showing th.11: the
inforr, •nt was a material witness.

There is no cvidcrr·c

in thL record that would Link the infc :-;nant to the
commis--.:_o!l o"

Li:c cri1w

0

•

l\ppcllai•t a •,ucs Lhut Dabli '

s 1-a tern· 't rnigh t i1i1ply thu t Dabbs bought

tli~

stickers,

and tlJ,'1.t if the informer wa0 the seller of tlw stickecs,
his testimony would b2 material.
pp.5-6.)

(Brief of Appellant,

The error in this argument is that there is

no evidence that the informant was the seller, and
respond< it submits that speculation drawn from an infl·rence
cannot rcJlace the evidence appellant must produce to carry
his burden of demonstrating materiality.
The cases cited by appellant are factually
distinguishable from the present case.
States, 353 U.S. 53
221 F.2d 582

(1957);

Port0_'_"''.'~~~-

In Rovario v. United
Uni!_ed 5._!:ates,

(5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Conforti, 200

F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952); and Sorrentino v. United St2tes,
163 F.2d 627

(9th Cir. 1947); each defendant was charged

with the sale of a narcotic drug to an unnamed inform2r,
and each defendant sought disclosure of the alleged buyer's
identity.

In the case of a narcotic sale to an

-8-

unnarn(~cl
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buyc·1·, di.sc 1 CJ

ire of the: inform21nt' s

cssc_,ntial to tc: e defense.

identity would be

In this case, however, there

is no ovicknce tli.ct thr' informar:t p'Orticipated in the
offense, and his

'StiI"':lny has not b~,en shown to be

r:atc>r: ·11 to the is· uc of guilt.
Co ur ;_- tu f inc1 thd t

Respondent urges the

thr• tr ici 1 court proper J y denied

appellant's disclosure request.
POIN'r III
THE COUHT BELOW PROPERLY DENIED APPELL.7\NT' S
JliOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE I3ECAUS!: APPELLANT FAILED
TO CARRY HIS BURDEil OF GOING FOR\F1HD ON THE MOTION.

Appellant attempted to suppress evidence
obtained during a search under a warrant.

Searches

conducted pursuant to a warrant are presumptively
valid, and the movant has the burden of showing that
the search was illegal.
563 P.2d 1034

(1977); State v. Willcutt, 19 Or.App.

93, 526 P.2d 607
Ga_~linq

State v. Ame:>_, 222 Kan. 88,

De\~ice:'_,

(1974); United States v. Various
478 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1973).

SpecificMlly, the defendant has the burden of
dcmonst1ating that an affidavit on which a search
warrant issues is invalid under SpineJli_v. United
StutE's, 393 U.S. 410

(1969), and Aguilar v. Texas,
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:no Ti.s.

103

(1%1).

:"._:r~,_,,

~11:)1_:_'_:_

al

92,

563 P.2c1 at 1039-40;

'l'>. is Cou·ct has helcl
def,~11

!ant bears thc> l·•1cde11 of persuasion in moving l•'

that a
suppres~

cvidc,ncc; where the dcfcnc!ant's stancling is in issue.

93'

In thi·

(19GG).

to the content of

t11:-~

Cc1sc, app...:llar,·c. produced no c·Jicl·nce as
ciffirlcwit in SUIJ[l'::Jrt of his mo::ion to

The presumption of constitutionality was not

suppress.

overcornP, and respondent submits that the trial court
pro?erly denied U1e motion to suppress.
POINT IV
THE COUR1' BELOW PROPEHLY APPLIED TH:C PRE SUI; 'PION
OF UTi\Ii CODE Mm. § 76-6-402

(SUPP. 1977), IN THIS Ci\ "''

The Utah criminal code provides that

posse~.

con of

recently stolen property is prima facie evidence that the
possessor stole the property, unless a satisfactory e .0lanation is rnac'!c'.
In State

Utah Code Ann.

v:..~Con,;.:.C\le:;_,

§

76-6-402(1)

(Supp.

30 Utah 2c1 302, 517 P.2d 547

1977).
(1'J73),

•1is Court held that the same inferences can be dra1•m from
the posscssi0n of recently stolen property in a
CilSe

as in

ci

larceny case.

burgl~ry

Respondent do'.<.; not undeJ: ,-

c~and

appellant's fourth point on a.ppeal to dispute the 0cmz'1_1Ps
holding.

The suffici_c'ncz of

the evidence,

i;'cluc1inci tlle
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eviclcJJcc• of po :'.;ession of the stole · govJs, will be discussed
in Point V, inFra.

This point will be limited to a discussion

of the .CJ.£J,llical_)ilJ:_ty of the presumption to this case.
First, appellant was founcl in possession of ~oo~s
that weer·

1

-os·i_tively identified as stolen (R.68-70, 74).

Second, appellant ·_1ffen:d no explanation of his possession
of any of the stolen goods except the television.

His

explanation of possession of the television was that it
belonged to a friend.
kno~

The owner of the television did not

the appellant, nor did he give appellant permission to

use it (R.67-68).

The appellant's explanation is, therefore,

not satisfactory.

Finally, the goods in appellant's

possession were stolen recently.

The burglary occurred

between late September 15, 1977, and 7:00 a.m. September 16,
1977, and the search was conJucted in the afternoon of
September 22, 1977.

The question of what is such a recent

possession as to raise the presumption is a question of fact,
and a possession as long as four months from the date of the
theft can present a jury question.
110, 143 Pac. 134

(1914).

and the discovery of stolen

State v. Bowen, 45 Utah

A 39 day period between a burglary
goo~s

is not too great a period

for evidence of possession of the goods to support a burglary
convictio1

State v. Ledbetter, 17 Utah 2d 353, 412 P.2d 312,
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cert-.. der1i
t\1(' six

1 385 U.S.

922

(l9i,0).

Res_:onc1cnt submiLs that

t_o seven day period hct\,1een the burglary ctnc1 the

search Llised a question of fact, properly resolved below,
of whetlu'r apf_)ellant

Wil~>

in possession of "recently"

stolen 9oods.
f\.,'"spondcn I:. ,-cubmi to; tho I:. the
posses3or

prc:ou~1ption

tho t

the

of recently stolen goods stole the goods was

properly applied in this burglary case.
POINT V
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
OF THE COUR'l' BELO\'/.
Appellant's brief alludes to facts brought out
at preliminary hearing, such as the allegation that the
appellant had just moved into Dabbs' apartment
Appellant, p. 11).
of the

prc~lirninarv

(Brief of

The record does not contain the transcript
hearing, nor does it contain any other

evidence to support appellant's contention that he recently
Respondent submits that

moved into Dabbs' apartment.

appellant's factual allegation is improperly before the
Court.
The evidence in the record and the inferences
fairly dr0wn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict are as follows:
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A burglary was cornIT.itted at Cone's service
station.

The

ar~ellant

was found, seven days later and

two city blocks away, in possession of goods taken during
the burglary.

Appellant offered no explanation as to his

possession of the stolen meat or stickers, and stated that
th~

television belonged to an unnamed friend.

In fact,

the mmer of the television did not know the appellant or
give him permission to

u~~

it.

The appellant's explanation

of his possession of the television was either false or
unsutisfactory.
As the Court stated in State v. Thomas, 121
Utah 639, 641, 244 P.2d 653, 654 (1952):
• • possession of articles
recently stolen, when coupled with
circumstances inconsistent with
innocence, such as • . • . making a
false or improbable or unsatisfactory
explanation of the possession, may be
sufficient to connect the possessor
with the offense of burglary and
justify his conviction of it."
Respondent submits the evidence was sufficient to support
the verdict.
CONCLUSION
Bas 0 d on the foregoing points and authorities,
respondent asks that the judgment of the court below be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
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